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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

1
2 **INTRODUCTION**
3

4 Movant, James R. Bartholomew (“Mr. Bartholomew” or “Movant”) respectfully submits
5 this Reply to the Detectives’ Endowment Association Annuity Fund’s (the “Fund”) Memorandum
6 of Law in Opposition to James R. Batholomew’s Motion for Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and
Approval of Lead Counsel.

7 The Fund tacitly acknowledges that Mr. Bartholomew – who suffered losses 14 times
8 greater than those allegedly suffered by the Fund – has the largest financial interest of any movant.
9 Yet, in arguing against Mr. Bartholomew’s appointment, the Fund fails to affirmatively
10 demonstrate (1) that Mr. Bartholomew is somehow inadequate to represent the Class; or (2) that
11 Mr. Bartholomew is subject to unique defenses rendering him incapable of representing the class.
12 *See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).* The Fund’s arguments against Mr. Bartholomew’s
13 appointment therefore fail, as described more fully below.

14 First, the Fund’s challenges to the validity of Mr. Bartholomew’s certification have no
15 basis whatsoever in the PSLRA nor in the relevant case law. Indeed, the Fund’s own certification
16 suffers from some of the same purported infirmities they identify.

17 Second, the Fund liquidated all of its shares prior to any corrective disclosure and,
18 accordingly, suffered no compensable losses based on UTStarcom’s alleged options backdating
19 fraud. *See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336, 338-346 (2005). As such, the Fund is **not**
20 **even a class member**, let alone the most adequate movant.¹ This deficiency means the Fund is
21 neither typical nor capable of adequately representing the Class.

22 Third, the Funds’ assertion that their status as an institutional investor renders them
23 somehow more adequate than an individual investor having substantially greater losses is

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25 ¹ The Class Action Allegations of the complaint clearly state that “Plaintiff brings this action
26 as a class action under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf
27 of a class of persons and entities who purchased UT Starcom securities during the Class Period
and **were damaged thereby** (the “Class”)” (emphasis added). *See* Compl. at ¶ 15. Because it was
not damaged by the corrective disclosures alleged in this case, the Fund does not even qualify as a
member of the class.

1 unsupportable. In reality, courts should – and do – appoint individual investors as lead plaintiffs
 2 over competing institutional investors when (as here) the individual investor has the greatest
 3 financial interest in the litigation.

4 Mr. Bartholomew is clearly the most adequate plaintiff, possessing the largest financial
 5 interest in the litigation and being both typical and adequate. Thus, Mr. Bartholomew’s Motion
 6 for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and For Approval of Lead Plaintiff’s Selection of Counsel
 7 should be granted and the Fund’s motion should be denied.

8 **ARGUMENT**

9 **I. THE SPECIOUS ARGUMENTS CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF MR.
 10 BARTHOLOMEW’S CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE DISCARDED.**

11 None of the Fund’s challenges to Mr. Bartholomew’s certification have any basis in fact or
 12 law, and each should be discarded. Counter to the Fund’s assertions, nothing in the PSLRA
 13 requires Mr. Bartholomew to disclose his age, occupation, or other personal information. Nor is
 14 it in any way significant that the date on his certification form was edited to accurately reflect the
 15 date he signed that form – particularly in light of the fact that the Fund did *precisely the same*
 16 *thing*.² Finally, the Fund’s argument that Mr. Bartholomew is somehow inadequate because he
 17 held his UTStarcom shares through the end of the class period holds no water – indeed, it is the
 18 fact that Mr. Bartholomew did so that makes him an adequate lead plaintiff, just as the fact that the
 19 Fund did not do so renders it inadequate to represent the Class. *See* Section II.A, *infra*. For these
 20 reasons, as further discussed below, the Court should disregard these arguments entirely.

21 First, the PLSRA-mandated requirements for a plaintiff certification are clear: (1) plaintiff
 22 has reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing; (2) plaintiff did not purchase the securities at
 23 the direction of counsel or solely to participate in the litigation; (3) plaintiff is willing to serve as a
 24 representative; (4) plaintiff sets forth all transactions in the security; (5) plaintiff identifies any

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 27 ² The Fund also crossed out the date of its certification form, inserted the correct date and
 signed the form. The certification originally stated “September 2007”, and the Fund crossed out
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1 other action in which plaintiff sought to serve as representative; and (5) plaintiff will not accept
 2 payment for serving as a representative, unless ordered or approved by the court. 15 U.S.C. §§
 3 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). Plainly, the PSLRA does not require the self-identifying information called
 4 for by the Fund. Indeed, while the Fund spends an entire page listing the requirements of a
 5 PSLRA certification, nothing requires a movant's age, occupation or address. Thus, this argument
 6 has no merit.

7 The Fund's second argument regarding the certification's date is equally meritless.
 8 Plainly, the hand-written date reflects the day he signed the form, whereas the crossed-out July
 9 date references the date on which counsel sent the document to Mr. Bartholomew. Indeed, the
 10 "draft" complaint referenced in the certification is wholly consistent with the crossed-out July
 11 date, as no actual filed complaint existed in July. There is simply nothing amiss with this
 12 certification, and the Court should not countenance the Fund's sophistry, particularly since, again,
 13 the Fund did the same thing. Of course, one important difference remains: Mr. Bartholomew has a
 14 financial interest fourteen (14) times that of the Fund.

15 The Fund's final arguments are even more puzzling. Characterizing Mr. Bartholomew's
 16 lack of UTStarcom stock sales or prior securities class action lead plaintiff appointments as
 17 problematic, the Fund again questions the validity of Mr. Bartholomew's certification. Rather
 18 than red flags, these points are red herrings. Simply stated, Mr. Bartholomew's certification lists
 19 no sales and no lead plaintiff appointments because none exist. He never sold any UTStarcom
 20 stock, and has never served as a lead plaintiff before. His certification accurately reflects this
 21 reality. Obviously, this in no way invalidates his certification.

22 Indeed, the Fund perversely argues against Mr. Bartholomew's application on the basis
 23 that he bought more shares than the Fund and held those shares through both corrective
 24 disclosures, entitling him to a valid claim (unlike the Fund). In other words, the Fund turns the
 25 PSLRA and *Dura* on their heads and argues that the facts that Mr. Bartholomew has the largest
 26 financial interest in this litigation and can actually properly plead the element of loss causation

27
 28 that date and wrote "October 2007" above.

1 somehow renders him inadequate. Obviously, the Court should reject these efforts at obfuscation
 2 and appoint Mr. Bartholomew as lead plaintiff in this litigation.

3 **II. THE FUND IS NOT AN ADEQUATE PLAINTIFF, LET ALONE THE MOST
 4 ADEQUATE MOVANT BEFORE THIS COURT**

5 The Fund cannot meet the requirements set forth by the Private Securities Litigation
 6 Reform Act (“PSLRA”) for appointment of lead plaintiff.³ The Fund’s lack of compensable losses
 7 means it could not possibly have the largest financial interest in the litigation. This also renders
 8 the Fund inadequate and atypical, meaning the Fund cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.

9 **A. The Fund Has No Financial Interest in the Litigation.**

10 It is black letter law that securities fraud plaintiffs who sell their shares and liquidate their
 11 position entirely prior to the dissemination of corrective disclosures⁴ cannot satisfy the essential
 12 element of loss causation and therefore cannot maintain a viable claim. *See Dura*, 544 U.S. at,
 13 338-346. The Fund sold *all of its shares prior to any corrective disclosure* of UTStarcom’s
 14 options backdating, and therefore cannot in good faith claim that their losses were “caused” by
 15 those disclosures.

16 Two corrective disclosures gave rise to this case. The first occurred on November 7, 2006.
 17 On this date, in reaction to news that UTStarcom had commenced a voluntary review of its
 18 historical equity award grant practices, the Company’s share price fell 9%. Compl. at ¶ 66. The
 19 second occurred on July 24, 2007, when UTStarcom announced that the preliminary results of this
 20 review revealed the need to restate their financial reports by approximately \$28 million for the

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 22
 23 ³ In appointing a lead plaintiff, the Court must consider which movant has the largest
 24 financial interests in the relief sought by the class; and whether the movant otherwise satisfies the
 25 requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
 4(3)(B)(iii)(I)

26 ⁴ *Dura* defines corrective disclosures as: “when facts...become generally known” and “as a
 27 result” share value “depreciate[s].” 544 U.S. at 344. Some courts require that a corrective
 disclosure correct a specific misrepresentation. Others hold that corrective disclosure can be a
 more general statement that reveals the true condition of the company.

1 years 2000 through 2006. In response to this revelation, the Company's share price plummeted by
 2 22%. Compl. at ¶¶ 69-70.

3 Significantly, the Fund had entirely liquidated its UTStarcom holdings *over a year before*
 4 *these disclosures were made*. According to its certification, the Fund held a total of 16,600 shares
 5 as of September 15, 2004. It sold all of these shares in two separate transactions: (1) 5,700 shares
 6 on March 8, 2005; and (2) 10,900 shares on April 4, 2005. Thus, any loss suffered by the Fund
 7 cannot be attributed to the revelations of the Company's options backdating fraud, and the Fund
 8 cannot maintain a case based on those revelations. *See Dura*, 544 U.S. at 347. As such, the Fund
 9 has suffered **no** compensable losses, and, accordingly, cannot be said to have the "largest financial
 10 interest" in this litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(3)(B)(iii)(I). Indeed, not only is the Fund not the
 11 most adequate movant, *it is not even a class member*. *See Note 1, supra*.

12 **B. The Fund is Neither Typical Nor Adequate**

13 The PSLRA also requires that lead plaintiff movants satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.
 14 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc). In the Ninth Circuit, a lead plaintiff movant must not only
 15 have the largest financial stake, but must also satisfy the typicality or adequacy requirements. *See*
 16 *In re Cavanaugh*, 306 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2002). Since the Fund did not hold a single
 17 UTStarcom share at the time of any corrective disclosure, as illustrated above, the Fund suffered
 18 no loss attributable to UTStarcom's options backdating fraud and therefore cannot be a typical or
 19 adequate representative of the class.⁵ If appointed as lead plaintiff, the Fund would face a motion
 20 to dismiss on loss causation grounds and the Court would dismiss the case before even reaching
 21 discovery. The Court simply cannot appoint a lead plaintiff whose own infirmities would so
 22 jeopardize the claims of the entire class.

23
 24 _____
 25 ⁵ *See Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P. Sec. Litig.*, No. C-03-2522, 2006 WL 1180267,
 *9 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2006)(holding that shareholders who sold their stock prior to the first
 corrective disclosure did not suffer any loss and could not be part of the class); *see also Kops v.*
NVE Corp., No. Civ. 06-574 et al., 2006 WL 2035508, *4-5 (D. Minn. July 19, 2006) (finding that
 a plaintiff who had sold all of his shares prior to the corrective disclosure had not suffered any loss
 as a result of defendants' actions).

1 **III. THE FUND'S STATUS AS AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR DOES NOT MAKE**
 2 **IT THE MOST ADEQUATE LEAD PLAINTIFF**

3 Even if the Fund was a class member – which, with no compensable loss, it is not -- Mr.
 4 Bartholomew's financial interest in the litigation dwarfs that of the Fund. Mr. Bartholomew's
 5 losses total \$2,106,513.00, while the Fund's alleged losses total a \$154,752.30 – a mere 7% of Mr.
 6 Bartholomew's figure. It is no doubt the Fund's recognition of this minimal financial interest that
 7 led the Fund to argue it is somehow the most adequate lead plaintiff (despite its minimal losses)
 8 solely because it is an institutional investor. However, the plain language of the PSLRA makes no
 9 special provision for finding institutional investors as most adequate plaintiffs when an individual
 10 movant has a significantly larger financial interest in the matter.⁶ Rather, the PSLRA provides “in
 11 categorical terms that the *only* basis on which a court may compare plaintiffs competing to serve
 12 as lead is the size of their financial stake in the controversy.” *In re Cavanaugh*, 306 F.3d 726, 732
 13 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).

14 Further, the cases cited by the Fund appointing an institutional investor as lead plaintiff
 15 over other movants with larger losses do little to bolster the Fund's argument. In these cases, the
 16 other movants, disfavored by the courts, were groups of unrelated investors joined together for the
 17 sole purpose of aggregating their losses in an effort solely to obtain lead plaintiff status.⁷
 18 Although law makers may have enacted the PSLRA to encourage institutional investors to take a
 19 more active role in securities litigation, the Ninth Circuit has held that it does not “require[] the

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21 ⁶ 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(b)(iii)(I)(bb) states that the court shall adopt a presumption that the
 22 most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or group of
 23 persons that-- “in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief
 24 sought by the Class.”

25 ⁷ See *Xianglin Shi v. Sina Corp.*, No. O5 Civ 2154, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13176, at 10-11
 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding an institutional investor to be a more suitable lead plaintiff than an
 27 investor group composed of two sets of family relations and five, “wholly-distinct, unrelated sub-
 28 groups”); see also *Bowman v. Legato Sys., Inc.*, 195 F.R.D. 655, 658 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
 29 that an institutional investor was better suited for appointment as lead plaintiff over a group of
 30 individuals with no relationship prior to the litigation, joined for the sole purpose of obtaining lead
 31 plaintiff status).

district court to select the plaintiff it believes is ‘the most sophisticated investor available.’ ”
Tanne v. Autobytel, 226 F.R.D. 659, 670 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (*quoting Cavanaugh*, 306 F.3d at 737). Consequently, there is no *per se* rule requiring that an institutional investor be appointed lead plaintiff in lieu of an individual who has a larger stake in the litigation. *See* *Tanne*, 226 F.R.D. at 670; *see also* *Cavanaugh*, 306 F.3d at 737, n. 20. Rather, the plain terms of the PSLRA make it clear that it is the movant with the largest financial interest who is the presumptive most adequate movant – regardless of whether that movant is a person or a institution. Here, that movant is obviously Mr. Bartholomew.

CONCLUSION

10 For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Bartholomew's Motion for Appointment as Lead
11 Plaintiff and For Approval of Lead Plaintiff's Selection of Counsel should be granted and the
12 Fund's motion should be denied.

¹³ Dated: November 30, 2007 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mark Punzalan

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Mark Punzalan, declare:

I am employed in San Francisco County, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business address is Finkelstein Thompson LLP, 100 Bush Street, Suite 1450, San Francisco, California 94104.

On November 30, 2007, I served the following document:

**JAMES R. BARTHOLOMEW'S REPLY TO THE DETECTIVES' ENDOWMENT
ASSOCIATION ANNUITY FUNDS' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION OF JAMES
R. BARTHOLOMEW FOR APPOINTMENT AS LEAD PLAINTIFF**

- By electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent notification of such filing to the e-mail address listed below:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California on November 30, 2007.

/s/ Mark Punzalan